Mardi 17 mars 2020 (Séance annulée) — Séminaire DYNAMICS

  • Michel Beine (University of Luxembourg) ;
  • Martin Ravallion (Georgetown University).
  • 16:30-19:00 ;
  • PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, Salle R1-09.

Michel Beine (University of Luxembourg)
Assessing the Role of Immigration Policy for Foreign Students: the Case of Campus France (travail conjoint avec Lionel Ragot)

This paper studies the intended and unintended effects of a specific policy conducted by the French Government around 2006 aiming at boosting the number of foreign stu- dents admitted in French universities. The Campus France program aimed at facili- tating the application process of foreign candidates from some particular countries and applying in specific universities. We develop a small theoretical model that allows for the existence of capacity constraints in order to analyse the potential effects of such a policy in terms of student inflows and in terms of selection. Using a Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff approach, we test the impact of Campus France on the magnitude of inflows. We pay attention in terms of heterogeneity of these effects across types of universities. We find that the Campus France policy led to a global increase of inflows of foreign students around 8%. The increase is concentrated on universities outside the top 150 of the Shanghai Ranking, suggesting a higher selection from better universities. We also use the CF policy as a way to test the potential crowding-out effects on native students while taking care of the usual endogeneity concerns in terms of location. We do not find any impact of crowding-out, either on native students or on foreign students coming through the traditional channel.

Martin Ravallion (Georgetown University)
A Market for Work Permits (travail conjoint avec Michael Lokshin)

There is a huge potential for economic development through liberalizing international migration. However, it will be politically difficult to realize that potential without some form of protection for host-country workers. The paper explores the scope for efficiently managing migration and refugees using a competitive market for work permits. Host-county workers would be granted the legal option of renting out their implicit citizenship work permits for a period of their choice, while foreigners purchase time-bound work permits. Aggregate labor supply need not rise in the host country. However, total output would rise and workers would see enhanced social protection. Simulations for the US and Mexico suggest that the new market would attract many skilled migrants, boosting GDP and reducing poverty in the US.